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INADEQUACY OF THE ENTRAPMENT
DEFENSE GLOBALLY AND THE NEED TO
REEVALUATE OUR CURRENT LEGAL
RUBRIC
Paul W. Valentine

SECTION I
Introduction
It is fair to say that a majority of us have either seen or
been exposed to the hit television show To Catch a Predator on
NBC. To Catch a Predator is a series of hidden investigations by
the television newsmagazine Dateline NBC devoted to the subject
of identifying and detaining potential child sexual abusers who
contact children over the internet. 1 The show is important because
those caught by the investigators oftentimes raise the entrapment
defense, but to no avail. Given the emergence of internet sting
operations and covert government investigations, it is now more
important than ever that the defense be given some credence by
courts throughout the world. However, recent case law and the
general international skepticism of the defense are slowly eroding
this important procedural protection.
1

For those who are not familiar with the series, here is a brief snapshot of
how it works: Off the air, Perverted- Justice volunteers build profiles of clearly
underage individuals on social networking websites, and enter chat rooms as
decoys. Would-be predators are invited to an undercover house used by Dateline
for the duration of the operation; in accordance with Perverted-Justice policy,
phone contact is always established with a suspected predator before any
appointment is set up. The visitors are led to believe that the supposed minor is
home alone, and, upon coming inside the house, are soon confronted by host
Chris Hanson. At this point the individual is excoriated on hidden camera for all
of America to see, where he is interviewed by Hanson, and eventually arrested.
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Black’s Law Dictionary 2 provides us with entrapment’s
most cursory definition: “a law enforcement officer’s or
government agent’s inducement of a person to commit a crime, by
means of fraud or undue persuasion, in an attempt to later bring a
criminal prosecution against that person.” In the early 1900’s,
American courts began to conceptualize entrapment as a criminal
defense that “strikes a balance between criminal predisposition and
overzealous law practices.” 3 Courts and commentators alike have
applied two strands of analysis to the entrapment defense: the
subjective approach and the objective approach. While the
subjective approach focuses on the state of mind of the accused,
the objective approach concentrates on the involvement of
government agents in the commission of the crime in question. 4
This broad ideology has driven the development of the entrapment
defense throughout the world.
Internationally, there is limited interest in the entrapment
defense. 5 Until very recently, the entrapment defense was
available only in the United States; it was not a feature in English
common law, and no other industrialized nations traditionally
recognized it. Entrapment’s absence from these other legal
traditions is due partly to other devices in their legal systems for
regulating police activity, such as outright criminal liability for
government agents who overreach. 6 A second possible factor is
the cultural difference regarding privacy expectations, as
Europeans seem to have a greater tolerance for more invasive
government surveillance. 7 Although some countries have begun to
recognize the entrapment defense for the first time, they are
generally far less judicious than U.S. courts in awarding the
entrapment defense. 8
2

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 573 (8th ed. 2004). Note that entrapment needs
a government nexus; it cannot be committed by private actors acting privately.
3
PAUL MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 1 (3d ed., Lexis 2002).
4
See generally Scott C. Patton, The Government Made Me Do It: A
Proposed Approach to Entrapment Under Jacobson v. United States
Introduction, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 995, 996 (1994) (discussing the development
of the entrapment defense in the United States).
5
Australia, for example, imposes only an exclusionary rule on evidence or
testimony related to police overreaching. See Paul Marcus & Vicki Waye,
Australia and the United States: Two Common Criminal Justice Systems
Uncommonly at Odds, 12 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 27, 73-78 (2004). Singapore
does not recognize the defense at all.
6
See Jacqueline E. Ross, Tradeoffs in Undercover Investigations, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1501, 1521 (2002) (explaining that in Europe the general rule is for the
defendant to be found guilty but for the police to be charged as accessories to the
crime that would be analogous to entrapment situations in the U.S).
7
Id. at 521-22.
8
It is important to remember that most civil law countries do not recognize
the entrapment defense. However, in the countries that do recognize the defense,
the majority take an objective view of it. I have chosen to focus on some of the

24

PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION

[Vol. 1:1

Because there is no universal entrapment test, it has
become especially difficult for law enforcement agents to make ex
ante determinations about the legal consequences of their
investigations. According to a recent study conducted in the
United States, entrapment claims appear to be decreasing in almost
every state and in the federal courts from the peak years in the
1980s and early 1990s. 9 This trend leaves us more questions than
answers.
In the following comment, I provide a critique of the
subjective and objective approaches to entrapment which have
become the two approaches adopted world-wide. Within this
context, I discuss the inherent problems of both approaches, which
are even more pronounced in cases of suspected terrorists. This
comment will conclude by suggesting that every country should
treat the entrapment defense as a due-process issue and should
have a carefully designed order and allocation of proof in such
trials.
SECTION II
The Development of the Entrapment Defense in the United States
The entrapment defense in the United States has evolved
mainly through oscillating case law. At first, there was a genuine
judicial distrust of the entrapment defense. 10 However, courts in
the early twentieth century began to recognize the validity of a
doctrine that protected people from overreaching government
investigations. The court in Woo Wai v. United States was the first
to officially recognize the defense. 11 As entrapment jurisprudence
more well-known countries in the world. In English law, entrapment is not a
substantive defense because it does not automatically negate the prosecution’s
case. See, e.g., R v. Sang, [1980] A.C. 402 (U.K.) [hereinafter Sang]. Likewise,
the German Federal Court of Justice has established that entrapment by
undercover police agents is not a reason to drop the case per se. 1 STR 148/54
(May 23, 1984).
9
Dru Stevenson, Entrapment by Numbers, 16 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1,
2-3(2005) (discussing how entrapment claims are disproportionately raised in
California, Florida, Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and
Washington).
10
See Board of Comm’ns v. Backus, 29 How. Pr. 33, 42 (1864) (stating that
the entrapment defense “has never availed to shield crime or give indemnity to
the culprit, and it is safe to say that under any code of civilized, not to say
Christian, ethics, it never will”).
11
223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915) [hereinafter Woo]. In Woo, the defendant was
urged by undercover immigration officers to transport Chinese immigrants into
the United States. Although he at first rebuffed the government’s suggestions
that he illegally transport the immigrants, the defendant finally acted after several
months of government persuasion. Id. at 413. Despite his actions, the Ninth
Circuit eventually precluded Woo Wai from liability because they felt that “the
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progressed throughout the twentieth century, the theoretical
dichotomy of the defense took shape in the seminal Sorrells v.
United States decision. 12 The Hughes majority found that the
government entrapped the defendant as a matter of law. The court
opined:
“[When] the criminal design originates with the officials of
the Government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent
person the disposition to commit the alleged offense, there is a
need for an entrapment defense.” 13
The court’s soaring statement “implant in the mind of an innocent
person the disposition to commit the alleged offense” has been
dubbed the “subjective” approach because it emphasizes the state
of mind of the accused and allows the prosecution to defeat the
claim by proving that the accused was independently predisposed
to committing the crime. The court grounded its holding in the
supposition that Congress did not intend for criminal statutes to
apply when the government has actively lured an innocent person
into the commission of a crime. 14 Today, the state courts or
legislatures of 37 states have adopted the subjective test. 15 States
that have overtly espoused the subjective approach codify it by
using language such as “predisposed” or “an otherwise unwilling
person.” 16 The factors the court will consider as proof of
suggestion of the criminal act came from the officers of the government.” Id. at
415.
12
287 U.S. 435 (1932).
13
Id. at 442.
14
David J. Elbaz, The Troubling Entrapment Defense: How About an
Economic Approach, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 117, 124 (1999) (discussing the
history of the entrapment defense in America).
15
See Patton, supra note 4, at 1002, n.45. See also Sherman v. United States,
356 U.S. 369, 376 (1958) (Chief Justice Warren gave the most emphatic
definition of subjective entrapment of his time by describing that a defendant is
entrapped when “the Government plays on the weaknesses of an innocent party
and beguiles him into committing crimes he otherwise would not have
attempted.” Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992) [hereinafter
Jacobson] was the Supreme Court’s last major ruling on entrapment and
reaffirmed the influence of the subjective standard in American jurisprudence.
16
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN § 39-11-505 (1989) (This is a paradigm of a
subjective approach. The statute provides: “It is a defense to prosecution that law
enforcement officials, acting either directly or through an agent, induced or
persuaded an otherwise unwilling person to commit an unlawful act when the
person was not predisposed to do so); PA. STAT. ANN § 313 (providing “ A public
law enforcement official or a person acting in cooperation with such an official
perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the
commission of an offense, he induces or encourages another person to engage in
conduct constituting such offenses by either: 1) making knowingly false
representations designed to induce the belief that such conduct is not prohibited;
or 2) employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a substantial
risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than those who are
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predisposition are prior acts, later acts, reputation, and eagerness.
Although the law of evidence traditionally bars bringing into
evidence prior acts, in cases where entrapment is used as a defense,
the defendant has “opened the door” of his character thereby
allowing his prior acts to be admitted. 17
Conversely, Justice Roberts, who gave little deference to
the majority’s rationale (although in agreement with their
substantive result) focused on the conduct of the government rather
than the state of mind of the accused. 18 According to Justice
Roberts, the entrapment doctrine should protect society from
government overreaching by denying convictions instigated by
government’s own agents. 19 Justice Robert’s approach has been
dubbed the “objective” approach because it focuses on the actions
of government agents. Today, the minority of U.S. jurisdictions
use the objective approach. To eschew focusing on the state of
mind of the accused, state statutes use language such as
“committed by a person not otherwise disposed to commit it.” 20 In
effect, the objective approach focuses on the outrageousness of law
enforcement conduct and focuses on whether a hypothetical
reasonable law abiding citizen would be induced to commit a
crime he would not have otherwise committed. 21

ready to commit it); P.R. PENAL CODE ART. 31 (providing “[w]hoever commits
an offense act, the criminal intention being induced in his mind through
contrivance, persuasion or fraud of a public officer or by a private person acting
in collaboration with the public officer, shall not be held liable.”).
17
See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
18
See Patton, supra note 4, at 999 (discussing Justice Robert’s opinion: He
argued that the entrapment defense did not rest upon a “strained and unwarranted
construction of . . . criminal statutes.” Rather, it rests upon “a fundamental rule
of public policy” which grants exclusive power to (and imposes a duty upon) a
court to protect its own functions and preserve “the purity of its own temple.”).
19
Id.
20
See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.05 (1967) (providing “In any prosecution
for an offense, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant engaged in the
proscribed conduct because he was induced or encouraged to do so by a public
servant, or by a person acting in cooperation with a public servant, seeking to
obtain evidence against him for purpose of criminal prosecution, and when the
methods used to obtain such evidence were such as to create a substantial risk
that the offense would be committed by a person not otherwise disposed to
commit it. Inducement or encouragement to commit an offense means active
inducement or encouragement. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity
to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment.”).
21
See Patton, supra note 4, at 1003.
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SECTION III
The Emerging Forms of the Objective Approach Overseas
A. The Canadian Two-Pronged Objective Test
If Jacobson 22 is the portrait of entrapment jurisprudence in
America, R. v. Mack is its twin-brother in Canada. 23 The ringing
words of Mack have echoed in Canadian courts for nearly two
decades because the court for the first time developed a twopronged test to approach the entrapment defense. The courts first
look at if “the authorities provide a person with an opportunity to
commit an offence without acting on a reasonable suspicion that this
person is already engaged in criminal activity or pursuant to a bona
fide inquiry.”24 The second inquiry occurs after the court has found
that the police acted in the course of a bona fide inquiry, and looks to
see if the police went beyond providing an opportunity and induce
the commission of an offense. 25 In determining whether police
conduct goes further than providing an opportunity, a court will
assess the following non-exhaustive list of factors: The type of
crime being investigated, whether an average person would have
been induced, the persistence and number of attempts made by
police, and the type of inducement used. 26 Like the objective
approach adopted by the minority of U.S. courts, Canadian courts
have found the state of mind of the defendant inconsequential. In
effect, Canada uses an expanded American objective test where the
“reasonable person” is only one part of the inquiry. As the Mack
court made unequivocally clear, the conduct of the police is often
determinative.
B. The United Kingdom’s Loosely Test: A Unique Variation of the
Objective Approach
As recently as twenty-seven years ago, the court in Sang 27
brusquely disposed of the entrapment defense by stating that it was
not recognized in English law. However, Sang’s grip began to
weaken in the following decade when the doctrine of entrapment
22

See Jacobson, 503 U.S. 540.
R. v. Mack, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 903 (Can.) [hereinafter Mack].
24
Id. ¶ 115. For example, random virtue testing arises when a police office,
merely looking to increase his arrest statistics, places a wallet in an obvious
public location. Id.
25
Id. See also R. v. Amato, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 418 (Can.) (the court held that
polices’ two month request for drugs at defendant’s home and work was merely
solicitation and did not rise to the level of inducement).
26
Id. ¶ 133.
27
See Sang, [1980] A.C. 402.
23
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slowly developed. 28 In 2000, Regina v. Loosely 29 built on the
earlier entrapment cases, and contained the most detailed
examination of the applicable legal framework to the defense. 30
Lords Hoffman and Hutton expressly held that the predisposition
of the defendant to commit such a crime was not a determinative
factor, effectively rejecting U.S. Supreme Court’s subjective
approach. 31 Further, they proposed certain factors to be considered
in deciding whether the sale of heroin to undercover police officers
constituted entrapment. These factors included: whether the police
had reason to suspect the accused or a particular place as being
involved in illegal activities; the nature of the offense; the secrecy
and difficulty of detection; the manner in which the particular
criminal activity is carried on; and whether the undercover officers
presented the accused with an “unexceptional opportunity to
commit an offense. 32 On this final factor, they went on to explain
that “[u]ltimately the overall consideration is always whether the
conduct of the police or other law enforcement agency was so
seriously improper as to bring the administration of justice into
dispute.” 33
C. The German Scalar Objective Approach
Germany is one of the few civil law countries that
recognize the entrapment defense. 34 Thus, it should come as no
surprise that their concerns with entrapment are much different
than common-law countries. Instead of treating the defense as a
safe haven for individual rights, Germany treats the doctrine as one
that encourages undercover agents to minimize their facilitation of
28

See, e.g., R v. Keith, [1994] 98 Cr. App. R. 437 (U.K.) (court recognized
that defendants’ could have plausible entrapment claim with respect to tape
recordings by undercover officers posing as contract killers); Williams and
O’Hare v. DPP, [1994] 98 Cr. App. R. 209 (U.K.) (defendants arrested using a
van to prepare for a robbery could be precluded from liability if the police had
left the van for the defendants to stumble upon); Nottingham City Council v.
Amin, [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1071 (U.K.) (police officers posing as individuals could
legally check whether taxi-drivers were properly licensed only if they conduced
their investigations randomly).
29
R v. Loosely, [2001] 1 W.L.R. 2060 (U.K.) [hereinafter Loosely],
available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200102/ldjudgmt/jd011025/loose1.htm.
30
This wording is taken from Dan Squires, The Problem with Entrapment,
26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 352 (2006).
31
Id. ¶ 22.
32
Id.
33
Id. ¶ 25.
34
“Entrapment” is known in Germany as “Tatprovokation” or “Deed
provocation.”
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targets’ crimes. 35 In other words, German courts care not about
the person being investigated, but on the integrity of the
investigations. Thus, entrapment is only a mitigating factor at
sentencing and not a defense. 36 Unlike the United States, this is
not a bi-modal or an all-or-nothing approach. It acts as a scalar
concept, that is, a matter of degree; the greater the government
involvement, the greater the sentencing discount.
SECTION IV
The Pitfalls of Both the U.S. Subjective and International Objective
Approaches
A. The Subjective Approach Encumbers the Defendant’s Right to
a Fair Trial
Every subjective test lacks a well-principled legal
grounding. 37 The concept of “predisposition” creates a quagmire
in every case because it flows from no bright-line test and hinges
on the prior acts of the defendant. Thus, in subjective jurisdictions,
the prosecution is relying on factors and conditions which are
temporally separate from the criminal act for which the defendant
stands accused. 38 This thwarts not only many criminal law
principles, but principles grounded in every legal system. 39 To
establish “predisposition,” the prosecution will, without fail,
parade evidence of prior conduct before the jury. 40
In subjective jurisdictions, once evidence of prior conduct
is admitted, the burden of persuasion pendulum swings heavily
against the defendant, as he must somehow rebut the inference of
predisposition. In cases involving traditional victimless crimes
35

See Jacqueline E. Ross, The Place of Covert Surveillance in Democratic
Societies: A Comparative Study of the United States and Germany, 55 A.M.J.C.L.
493, 557 (2007) (discussing the German entrapment doctrine).
36
Id. at 539.
37
For a further discussion of other disadvantages outside the scope of this
comment see Patton, supra note 8 at 1029.
38
Yale Law Journal Company, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat: The
Constitutional Status of the Entrapment Defense, 74 YALE L.J. 942 (1965).
39
See Stephen E. Leidheiser, Out of the Quagmire After Jacobson v. United
States: Towards a More Balanced Entrapment Standard, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1055, 1068 (1993). In addition, note that it is impermissible under
the Federal Rules of Evidence, in both criminal and civil cases, to use evidence of
particular conduct to show a greater than average propensity to commit a crime.
FED. R. EVID. 404.
40
See, e.g,. United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2006) where the
prosecution was unfairly able to parade evidence of prior conduct unrelated to the
crime at issue. If we are to take the Brand ruling seriously, the prosecution needs
only to establish some link between the prior act and the crime at issue to satisfy
404(B)’s requirement.
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like drugs and alcohol, this pendulum has less momentum because
the defendant can plausibly rebut this inference by showing that he
has been rehabilitated. He can do this through some type of
tangible evidence, namely a negative test result, or a membership
to a rehabilitation clinic. However, in suspected terrorist cases,
this is no simple task. What if an individual is of a certain descent
or his parents were (at one time) affiliated with terrorist
organizations? Suppose this individual is now an adult, wants to
live the American dream and has no intent whatsoever to harm
civilians? Is this linkage to his parents’ sufficient predisposition as
to warrant law enforcement to entrap this individual? Probably.
Or, what about using a Russian scientist to sell nuclear blueprints
to Iran (as the U.S. did in 2002) to try to entrap Iran? Even with no
prior acts, courts have sometimes assumed that a defendant or
defendants(s) were already headed down an “iniquitous path.” 41
This is alarming. Judges have considerable discretion to impart
their personal view to decide predisposition. This is not good news
for children now in the United States born of Middle-Eastern
descent.
B. No Matter the Variation, All Objective Approaches are Flawed
Most objective standards [as evinced by the U.S. minority
and Canadian models] require the court to determine whether “the
conduct of the law enforcement agent was likely to induce a
normally law-abiding person to commit the offense.” 42 In his book
The Entrapment Defense, Paul Marcus vehemently criticizes the
practical application of this inquiry. 43 He argues that it is a
standard that is difficult to apply because “the conceptual difficulty
is that such reasonable individuals generally do not commit
Child pornography and suspected terrorism are
crimes.” 44
demonstrative of the difficulty of a successful entrapment defense
in cases of unusually abhorrent crimes. The failure of precedent
41

Marreel v. Florida, 841 So. 2d 600, 603 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (the
court ignored the fact that law enforcement agents initiation nineteen of the
emails and seven of the chat sessions of forty-seven total communications).
42
See People v. Barraza, 591 P.2d 947 (Cal. 1979) (the court concluded that
the proper entrapment test should ask whether “the conduct of the law
enforcement agent is likely to induce a normally law-abiding person to commit
the offense).
43
See MARCUS, supra note 3.
44
Id. This was also a dilemma articulated by the Alaska Supreme Court in
Pascu v. State, 577 P.2d 1064 (Alaska 1978) (holding “Since announcing our
decision in Grossman, we have come to realize that there are probably certain
difficulties in applying the foregoing standard. An “average person” probably
cannot be induced to commit a serious crime except under circumstances so
extreme as to amount to duress. Yet it is clear that entrapment may occur with a
degree of inducement that falls far short of actual duress.).
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reflects the long-term judgment of courts that no reasonable
person, regardless of police activity, would ever engage in an act
of child pornography, or terrorism. In other words, if we are to
take this seriously, objective individuals accused of these crimes
theoretically can never prevail. Although public policy should tip
the scales in favor of government when there are pedophiles and
terrorists on trial, there are inherent risks involved in giving law
enforcement unfettered discretion to apprehend these individuals
as they please.
To illustrate the above point, here is an example of
investigators acting as recruiters for a terror cell. Their plan is to
target individuals of Muslim descent. The investigators hatch a
fake plan to kill an untold number of civilians. To recruit, they
contact these Muslim individuals six hours a day for a span of over
three months, constantly badgering them at work, bribing them,
and threatening the safety of these individuals and their families.
Eventually, after several months, some succumb and commence
training. Upon arrest, they predictably raise an entrapment
defense. In an objective jurisdiction (New York, for example), it is
uncertain that these Muslim men who underwent months of
badgering will have a viable defense
At this point, it is necessary to evaluate the merits of the
hypothetical vis à vis some of the objective jurisdictions discussed
thus far. In the United States, no judge would find that a
“reasonable law abiding citizen,” would ever engage in terrorist
activities, as no level of government inducement justifies yielding
to such a temptation. In the United Kingdom, the type of crime
being investigated [one of the factors from Loosely] would work
heavily against the defendant. Furthermore, the court would likely
state that the defendant was not presented with an “unexceptional
opportunity” because the law enforcement agents conducted their
investigations through an intermediary, the telephone, and the
defendants always had the option to simply hang up. In Germany,
the court would consider the difficulty in detection of terrorism and
would give great deference to law enforcement agents. At best, the
defendants would have a mitigated punishment. Australia and
Singapore and many other nations would give absolutely no
credence to this defense whatsoever. Does this seem fair? 45 In
45

Worse yet, this problem is compounded because of the procedure raising
and adjudicating the defense. In most of these jurisdictions, an entrapment claim
is frequently presented to the court with no jury, as it is decided as a matter of
law. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(2) (objective test and issue
determined by the court); People v. Roy, 265 N.W.2d 20 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978)
(objective entrapment is a legal question for the trial court); State v. Pfister, 264
N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1978) (objective entrapment presents a jury question if there is
a factual dispute). In contrast, where the entrapment is based on the defendant’s
lack of predisposition, the issue is typically raised at trial, and the issue is one for
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essence, the objective approach is leading to the erosion of the
doctrine because courts throughout the world are only providing
defendants who commit the less serious crimes an escape hatch.
SECTION VI
A Due Process Approach to Entrapment
A. A Due- Process Approach
Applying a due process standard to the entrapment defense
is admittedly something that is not entirely new. Paul Marcus in
his 2002 book, The Entrapment Defense, allocates an entire
chapter, dubbed The Future of Entrapment, to explain that due
process will be more easily accepted and commonly made in cases
of entrapment. 46 Even prior to this, over thirty years ago in United
States v. Russell, the court noted “[we] may some day find a case
in which the conduct of law enforcement is so outrageous that due
process principles would absolutely bar the government from
invoking judicial proceedings.” 47 That day has come.
A due-process approach would also provide a better means
of deterrence. At present, the problem with using the entrapment
defense to deter misconduct is simply put as follows: it may be
only a small discomfort to the cop that the defendant goes free. 48
There is no reason to assume that the type of cop who would
engage in an illegitimate sting operation is the sort who would be
troubled by the defendant going free; in fact, the opposite seems
more likely to be the case. 49 Normally, when we adopt a policy of
deterrence, policymakers use more direct methods: sanction
attached to the forbidden behavior. 50 This is not the case with the
entrapment defense. The supposed sanction, or unpleasant
consequence, comes not in the form of direct harm to the bad cop,
but indirectly, as a (possibly) undeserved benefit to a third party,
the defendant. 51 Furthermore, entrapment is not a constitutional
the jury. See, e.g., State v. Stanley, 597 P.2d 998 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (adopts
subjective test; entrapment established as a matter of law only when evidence of
lack of predisposition is undisputed); Chambers v. State, 269 S.E.2d 42 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1980) (adopts subjective test; conflict in defendant’s and state’s evidence
presented a jury question).
46
See also Farley v. State, 848 So. 2d 393 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (the
court used due process language to make its decision).
47
411 U.S. 423 (1973).
48
Dru Stevenson, Entrapment and the Problem of Deterring Police
Misconduct, 37 CONN. L. REV. 67 (2004) (discussing the inadequacy of
entrapment as a deterrent).
49
Id at. 78.
50
Id. at 76.
51
Id.
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defense, unlike the exclusionary rules, and therefore does not
trigger the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine; this allows even
conscientious police to risk a successful entrapment defense being
raised by the accused, if there is the potential for “greater payoffs”
in the form of discovering evidence of other crimes, deterring
members of a criminal conspiracy, or incriminating third parties. 52
It would be more effective and efficient to deter improper
police conduct through a sanction placed directly on the officers.
Section 1983 actions may be more likely to influence individual
decisions than an indirect deterrence. 53 This type of deterrence
works as a perfect complement to a due process approach because
it would not deter the “good” law enforcement agents from
zealously investigating. To offend due process is no simple task.
The conduct of the police officer must be “so outrageous and
prejudicial to offend due process.” Officers who enforce the law
properly will not cross this high threshold. In other words, only
the officers who deserve to be punished will be.
B. A Specified Order and Allocation of Proof
Much like employment discrimination claims in the United
States, the process of evaluating the merits of an entrapment
defense should include a defined order and allocation of proof. I
suggest that this be a three-step test. The first step would require
the person claiming entrapment to make a prima facie case by
showing that but for the involvement of law enforcement, the
crime would not have been committed in the exact circumstance it
was committed. Put another way, it must be shown that if the
police or government were in no way involved, the crime would
not have been committed in the exact manner (e.g. same place,
same time, and same participants) it was committed. Here, the
claimant would have the burden of persuasion. This would not be
a difficult burden to overcome, but is important that this is satisfied
so as not to create a windfall of cases against the government.
Following this, the burden would shift to the investigator(s)
to produce evidence that this investigation was a) legitimate, b)
there were few, if any, alternatives, and c) that the decision was
made in good faith. This step would evaluate the outrageousness
of the government conduct. Subsequently, the government would
have the burden of production, which would require the
52
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Some commentators see personalized civil actions against officers as the
answer to the problems with the exclusionary rule. For a discussion, see Jeffrey
Standen, The Exclusionary Rule and Damages: An Economic Comparison of
Private Remedies for Unconstitutional Police Conduct, 2000 B.Y.U. L. REV.
1443 (2000).
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government to bring forth evidence of the type of crime being
investigated, the difficulty of detection, other means available, and
other mitigating factors. This second step resembles the objective
theories we have seen in the U.S. minority and some international
jurisdictions. If this were the standard, the defendants that were
put behind bars in my hypothetical would prevail because of this
step; it would be impossible for the government to legitimately
argue that their incessant phone calls were made in good faith.
If the government satisfies this step, the court would
proceed to the final inquiry, where the claimant still has the burden
of persuasion. Here, the defendant would have to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that considering the totality of the circumstances,
convicting him of the crime that was created by the government
would shock the judicial conscience. Although this resembles the
U.S. subjective test, there is a caveat embedded within:
predisposition is not dispositive; it is only part of the inquiry.
Public policy weighs in favor of this strict “shocking the
conscience” test because we generally want to prevent crimes from
happening.
However, by considering the totality of the
circumstances, defendants will not be unduly burdened by a single
prior act, their heritage, or other factors that would normally weigh
heavily in favor of a predisposition.

SECTION VII
Conclusion
Terrorism and its related crimes are without question
despicable offenses. However, we should not as a society abandon
our legal morals when investigating these crimes because, as is
often the case, some individuals who are apprehended are coaxed
into the committing the crime in the first place. At present, the two
competing approaches to entrapment worldwide have left the
defense in flux. With the increasing popularity of the internet and
technologically advanced surveillance tactics, anti-terrorism and
To Catch a Predator-type investigations will inevitably arise
everywhere. While a due process approach is not the ultimate
panacea, it is the complete overhaul of the defense that we have
needed. Every country on our planet should view entrapment
uniformly as a due process issue because it avoids the difficulty of
predisposition, and the injustices created by the hypothetical
reasonable person. Retributionists and utilitarians alike would
support a due process approach.
Internet blogs and websites are currently littered with
debates over the entrapment issue, and the end is seemingly
nowhere in sight. I ask readers this: The next time you are with
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acquaintances to watch the To Catch a Predator series, or hear
how a suspected terrorist is apprehended, I hope you see the
investigations from a new perspective and are, at the very least,
more skeptical about the validity of some of them. The fact is that
technology and entrapment are not mutually exclusive.
Antiterrorism, child pornography, and the like are national
priorities and highly technical undercover sting operations are a
main tool to combat them. As our legal system’s primary device
for regulating undercover stings, the scope and vigor of the
entrapment defense could impact all of our individual liberties.

